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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal from a final judgment of the Fourth District Court 
was brought pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. The final judgment was entered on September 21, 1992. 
(R. 370-71) Defendants' notice of appeal and undertaking on appeal 
were timely filed on September 28, 1992, (R. 372-77), within the 
thirty days allowed by Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
The appeal was filed with the Supreme Court, pursuant to its 
appellate jurisdiction over "orders, judgments, and decrees of any 
court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdiction," set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2-2(3)(j) (1992). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1991), 
this appeal was poured over to the Court of Appeals on November 17, 
1992. (R. 383) 
STATEMENT OP ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in enforcing plaintiff's proposed 
settlement agreement when: 
a. Its specific terms were never proposed nor agreed to by 
defendants? 
b. It had not been previously filed with the court or 
entered upon the minutes of the court as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-51-32 (1992) and Rule 4-504(8) of the Code of Judicial 
Administration? 
2. If the settlement agreement is a valid contract, is it 
voidable as a consequence of counsel's unilateral mistake of fact? 
3. If an agreement existed, did the trial court err in summarily 
enforcing it because its terms are ambiguous? 
Standard of Review; 
To the extent that the issues of this appeal involve a factual 
finding of the trial court, although the court did not appear to 
engage in any fact finding, a trial court's findings of fact will 
not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. State v, 
Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 770 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a). "Findings are clearly erroneous only when they are against 
the clear weight of the evidence or when the appellate court is 
convinced that a mistake has been made." Id. Further, 
[t]o show clear error in a finding of fact, the 
challenging party must marshal all evidence supporting 
the finding, and show that the finding is nevertheless 
against the great weight of the evidence. Additionally, 
due regard must be given to the trial court's ability to 
judge the credibility of witnesses. 
Merriam v. Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172, 1176 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(citations omitted). 
To the extent that the issues involve the trial court's 
conclusions of law, this Court may review the trial court's 
conclusions for correctness, affording them no deference. Tanner 
v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In general, settlement agreements are favored by the law 
because of the obvious benefits to both the parties and the 
judicial system. Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead, 
592 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1979). It is also well established that a 
settlement agreement may be summarily enforced by a motion in the 
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court of the original action. Id. Utah Courts, therefore, will 
"affirm the granting of a motion to compel settlement if the record 
establishes a binding agreement and xthe excuse for nonperformance 
is comparatively unsubstantial.'11 Zions First Nat'l Bank v. 
Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 478, 479 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (quoting Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co., 592 P.2d at 609). 
DISPOSITIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-32 (1992): 
78-51-32. Authority of attorneys and counselors. 
An attorney and counselor has authority: 
(1) to execute in the name of his client a bond or other 
written instrument necessary and proper for the prosecution of 
an action or proceeding about to be or already commenced, or 
for the prosecution or defense of any right growing out of an 
action, proceeding or final judgment rendered therein. 
(2) to bind his client in any of the steps of an action 
or proceeding by his agreement filed with the clerk or entered 
upon the minutes of the court, and not otherwise. 
(3) to receive money claimed by his client in an action 
or proceeding during the pendency thereof or after judgment, 
unless a revocation of his authority is filed, and, upon 
payment thereof and not otherwise, to discharge the claim or 
acknowledge satisfaction of the judgment. 
Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration: 
Rule 4-504. Written orders, judgments and decrees. 
Intent: To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written 
orders, judgments, and decrees to the court. This rule is not 
intended to change existing law with respect to the enforceability 
of unwritten agreements. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in courts of 
record except small claims. 
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Statement of the Rule: 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or 
parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen days, or within 
a shorter time as the court may direct, file with the court a 
proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity with the ruling. 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders 
shall be served upon opposing counsel before being presented to the 
court for signature unless the court otherwise orders. Notice of 
objections shall be submitted to the court and counsel within five 
days after service. 
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be 
reduced to writing and presented to the court for signature within 
fifteen days of the settlement and dismissal. 
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall be 
served upon the opposing party and proof of such service shall be 
filed with the court. All judgments, orders, and decrees, or 
copies thereof, which are to be transmitted after signature by the 
judge, including other correspondence requiring a reply, must be 
accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid postage. 
(5) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in 
such a manner as to show whether they are entered upon stipulation 
of counsel, the motion of counsel or upon the court's own 
initiative and shall identify the attorneys of record in the cause 
or proceeding in which the judgment, order or decree is made. 
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and decrees 
shall contain the address or the last known address of the judgment 
debtor and the social security number of the judgment debtor if 
known. 
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate 
documents and shall not include any matters by reference unless 
otherwise directed by the court. Orders not constituting judgment 
or decrees may be made a part of the documents containing the 
stipulation or motion upon which the order is based. 
(8) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation 
shall be signed or entered unless the stipulation is in writing, 
signed by the attorneys of record for the respective parties and 
filed with the clerk or the stipulation was made on the record. 
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written 
obligation to pay money and a judgment has previously been rendered 
upon the same written obligation, the plaintiff or plaintiff's 
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counsel shall attach to the new complaint a copy of all previous 
judgments based upon the same written obligation. 
(10) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the 
power of any court, upon a proper showing, to enforce a settlement 
agreement or any other agreement which has not been reduced to 
writing. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedure Below. 
Plaintiff and appellee, John Deere Company, brought this civil 
action against defendants and appellants, A & H Equipment, Inc., 
Wendell Hansen, Mark B. Anderson, and Vada A. Anderson, on June 20, 
1989. (R. 1-105) The trial court, Judge Cullen Y. Christensen of 
the Fourth Judicial District Court presiding, entered judgement on 
September 21, 1992 in favor of plaintiff on plaintiff's motion to 
enforce a settlement agreement purportedly entered into by the 
parties. (R. 370-71). Defendants appealed this order to the Utah 
Supreme Court on September 23, 1992. (R. 376-77) The Supreme 
Court subsequently poured the case over to the Utah Court of 
Appeals for disposition. (R. 379) 
Statement of Facts. 
Beginning in 1963, defendants Mark B. Anderson and Vada A. 
Anderson established an ongoing franchisor-franchisee relationship 
with plaintiff John Deere Co. (R. 136) In 1970, plaintiff, the 
Andersons, and defendants A & H Equipment and Wendell Hansen re-
established the franchise. ( R. 13 6) At the inception of the 
original 1963 franchise arrangement and, again, with the later 
franchise in 1979, plaintiff granted to defendants an exclusive 
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franchise territory covering six counties in Central Utah. (R. 
136) On June 21, 1983, defendant A & H Equipment, by and through 
defendant Wendell Hansen, entered into a series of agreements with 
plaintiff in connection with the franchise. (R. 103-104) Over the 
next several years, defendants entered into additional agreements 
with plaintiff. (R. 103-104) The franchise arrangement also 
required defendants to enter into various agreements with an 
affiliate of plaintiff, Farm Plan, Inc. (Farm Plan) (R. 398) Farm 
Plan, although a separate company from plaintiff, (R. 390), was 
directly involved in plaintiff's franchisor-franchisee arrangements 
because it is the financing arm of plaintiff, much like G.M.A.C. is 
the financing arm for General Motors. (R. 398) 
Because of a series of reverses in defendants7 business, 
defendants were unable to pay some of their obligations to 
plaintiff and Farm Plan. (R. 133-136) As a consequence of 
defendants7 failure to pay these obligations, some of which were 
based upon the same agreements that are exhibits in the present 
case, (R. 333), Farm Plan filed suit against A & H Equipment and 
Wendell Hansen in a case entitled Farm Plan Corp. v. A & H 
Equipment, et al. and Wendell Hansen, Fourth District Court Civil 
No. 980400905. (R. 333) Farm Plan was represented in this action 
by Kim Wilson. (R. 394) Defendants were not represented in the 
Farm Plan action by D. David Lambert, counsel for defendants in the 
present action, but entered into a stipulated settlement pro se. 
(R. 295-96, 333) 
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On June 1, 1989, judgment was entered against defendants in 
the amount of $36,062.47 plus interest and costs in the Farm Plan 
action. (R. 295-96). This judgment, which will subsequently be 
referred to as the John Deere Farm Plan judgment, was entered 
pursuant to Farm Plan's ex parte motion and the stipulation of Farm 
Plan and defendants A & H Equipment, Inc. and Wendell Hansen. (R. 
295-96, 333) During the times relevant to the present issues, Mr. 
Lambert was unaware of this judgment. (R. 395) 
On June 20, 1989, plaintiff filed the present action against 
defendants, alleging that defendants had defaulted on various 
obligations under the franchise agreements. (R. 1-105) Plaintiff 
was represented in this action, again, by Kim R. Wilson and also by 
Brent Stephens. (R. 105) 
Defendants, by and through their counsel in the present 
action, Mr. Lambert, answered plaintiff's complaint and filed a 
counterclaim which alleged that plaintiff had breached the parties' 
franchise agreements on numerous occasions by breaching its promise 
of an exclusive franchise territory, and had committed other 
tortious acts. (R. 130-137) The factual circumstances and issues 
raised in the counterclaim, including defendants' alleged defaults 
oft the franchise agreements and plaintiffs' various tortious 
actions alleged by defendants, were the issues underlying not only 
the issues raised by plaintiff's complaint, but the Farm Plan 
action. (R. 398) 
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Nearly two years after the initiation of the present lawsuit, 
defendants advised Mr. Lambert that they would be willing to 
dismiss their counterclaim against John Deere in return for a 
complete resolution of all John Deere-related matters. (R. 333) 
Accordingly, on April 10, 1991, Mr. Lambert wrote a letter to John 
Deere's counsel and proposed such a settlement. (R. 333) The 
letter referred to the present lawsuit by name and stated, in 
relevant part, "I have been asked by my client to propose a 
settlement with your client in the above referenced case. The 
settlement proposal is a mutual dismissal with prejudice and a 
general release of claims with each party to bear their respective 
costs and fees." (R. 315) (Emphasis added.) When he proposed this 
settlement by means of this wording, Mr. Lambert's understanding 
was that a general release would release all outstanding matters 
between the parties, including all outstanding judgments. (R. 395) 
Plaintiff's counsel accepted the offer by telephone on April 
15, 1991. (R. 312-13) Specific terms of the release agreement 
were not discussed during this conversation. (R. 33 3) On April 
22, 1991, plaintiff's counsel sent a letter confirming this 
conversation, stating, "This will confirm my telephone conversation 
of April 15, 1991, in which I accepted your settlement proposal 
contained in your letter of April 10, 1991. I will prepare the 
settlement documents and forward them to you for execution." (R. 
309) No specific terms were discussed in this communication 
either. 
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On May 8, 1991, plaintiffs counsel sent documents for 
signature to Mr. Lambert which purported to settle the dispute. 
(R. 3 06) The documents stated, in part: 
IN CONSIDERATION of the mutual dismissal of the 
Complaint of John Deere Company (hereinafter the 
"Plaintiff") and the Counterclaim of A & H Equipment, 
Inc.,, Wendell Hansen, Mark B. Anderson, and Vada A. 
Anderson (hereinafter the "Defendants") Plaintiff and 
Defendants hereby release and forever discharge the other 
from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, 
causes of action or suits of whatever kind or nature, 
which now exist or which may hereafter accrue, because 
of, arising out of, or in any way connected with that 
contractual dispute, the details of which are more fully 
set forth in the files and records of the District Court 
of Utah County, in that certain action entitled John 
Deere Company, plaintiff v. A & H Equipment, Inc. , 
Wendell Hansen, Mark B. Anderson, and Vada A. Anderson, 
defendants. Civil No. CV-89-1151, pending in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah . 
(R. 3 06) The language of this proposed agreement was not the 
comprehensive and general release which Mr. Lambert had anticipated 
when he proposed the settlement. (R. 332) Nevertheless, Mr. 
Lambert forwarded the proposed agreement to defendants, who advised 
him of their rejection of the agreement because it did not 
expressly include the John Deere Farm Plan judgment, and refused to 
sign the agreement. (R. 3 32) Mr. Lambert was not aware of the John 
Deere Farm Plan judgment until this time. (R. 333) 
On July 18, 1991, plaintiff's counsel wrote to Mr. Lambert, 
inquiring why defendants had not executed the documents. (R. 3 00) 
Mr. Lambert responded by requesting that the documents include the 
John Deere Farm Plan obligation in a letter dated July 29, 1991. 
(R. 298) His letter stated: 
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My client is concerned about making sure that the Mutual 
Release of All Claims comprehensively releases him from 
any obligations to John Deere. Specifically, my client 
would like to add John Deere Farm Plan as a releasing 
party. Please let me know if that is acceptable so that 
we can get this matter finalized. 
(R. 298) Shortly thereafter, Kim Wilson telephoned Mr. Lambert and 
told him that plaintiff would not agree that the general release of 
claims should include the Farm Plan obligation. (R. 332) 
At no time did defendants sign plaintiff's proposed settlement 
agreement, nor was the agreement ever filed with the clerk of the 
court. 
On October 22, 1991, plaintiff brought a motion to enforce its 
proposed settlement agreement. (R. 293-94) Defendants responded by 
filing a cross-motion to enforce their proposed settlement 
agreement, and requested oral argument. (R. 329-30, 336) 
On August 28, 1992, oral arguments were heard on the pending 
motions. (R. 361) In its memorandum decision, the court entered an 
order granting plaintiff's motion to enforce the settlement 
agreement, denying defendants' motion, and requiring defendants to 
execute plaintiff's proposed settlement documents. (R. 3 68-69) The 
court entered an order formalizing this decision on September 21, 
1992. (R. 371) Defendants' appeal of this order followed. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENFORCING THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT WHEN ITS SPECIFIC TERMS WERE NEVER PROPOSED NOR 
AGREED TO BY DEFENDANTS. 
A judgment entered to end litigation by consent of the parties 
is in the nature of a contract, and the court's authority to 
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approve such an agreement depends upon its validity. To be valid, 
such an agreement must have (1) the proper subject matter, (2) 
competent parties, (3) the assent or meeting of the minds of the 
parties, and (4) consideration. In the present case, there was no 
assent or meeting of the minds of the parties. 
For a meeting of the minds to occur, the agreement must embody 
a distinct understanding common to both parties, and acceptance 
must be unconditional and identical to the offer. In the present 
case, the trial court erred in finding that the parties assented to 
plaintiff's proposed agreement because the evidence on the record 
shows that defendant's initial offer was all-inclusive; was based 
upon all of the issues raised in the complaint and counter claim, 
and did not specify any limitations; plaintiff's proposed 
agreement, rather than being an unconditional acceptance of 
plaintiff's offer, was a counter-offer because it proposed terms 
that were materially different and more limited than defendants 
contemplated; and defendants clearly rejected it. Because no 
meeting of the minds occurred, but an offer and a counter-offer 
were made, none of which were accepted, no enforceable agreement 
came into being and the trial court erred in summarily enforcing 
it. 
Further, although counsel may bind a client in procedural 
matters arising during the course of the action, only the client 
has the authority to settle the action. Accordingly, to the extent 
that Mr. Lambert's letter of April 10, 1991 purported to settle 
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only the issues raised in plaintiff's complaint, not inclusive of 
the John Deere Farm Plan judgment, Mr. Lambert did not have the 
apparent or implied authority of defendants to do so, making the 
agreement invalid. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENFORCING THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
WHEN THE AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY FILED WITH THE 
COURT OR ENTERED UPON THE MINUTES OF THE COURT. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-32(2) (1992), Rule 4-504(8) of the Code 
of Judicial Administration, and Utah case law interpreting these 
statutes indicate that enforcement of settlement agreements that 
are not made before a court or are written, signed by the parties, 
and filed with the clerk of the court, may be found to be valid 
only if there are clear indicia on the record that an agreement was 
actually made. Absent such indicia, a court may not enforce a 
purported settlement agreement. In the present case, the purported 
settlement agreement was not made before the court nor written, 
signed by the parties, and filed with the clerk of the court. 
Further, the record indicates that the parties never actually made 
an agreement because they never agreed upon its specific terms. 
Accordingly, the purported settlement agreement is unenforceable 
under the intent of these statutes. 
III. IF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS ENFORCEABLE, IT WAS ENTERED 
INTO BY MISTAKE AND SHOULD BE RESCINDED. 
Should this court find that the parties actually entered into 
an enforceable settlement agreement, it should also find that the 
agreement is subject to rescission because of Mr. Lambert's 
unilateral mistake of fact. The record shows that a unilateral 
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mistake of fact occurred because Mr, Lambert was unaware of the 
existence of the John Deere Farm Plan judgment until after the 
settlement negotiations had begun and defendants had rejected the 
terms of plaintiffs7 proposed settlement documents. Because he was 
not specifically aware of the judgment, he did not specify it in 
his settlement offer, even though the language he used was 
inclusive enough to include it. Rescission should be granted for 
this mistake because: (1) It deprives defendants of their right 
and ability to prosecute their counterclaim without giving themthe 
benefit they bargained for in making the settlement offer; (2) 
inclusion of a release of the John Deere Farm Plan judgment was 
material to defendants7 willingness to settle the case; (3) 
although Mr. Lambert made reasonable inquiry regarding the facts, 
defendants and plaintiff's counsel did not specifically inform him 
of the existence of the John Deere Farm Plan judgment until after 
negotiations had commenced; and (4) rescission will not prejudice 
plaintiff because it will simply be restored to the position of 
having to prosecute its complaint. 
IV. IF AN AGREEMENT EXISTED, ITS TERMS WERE AMBIGUOUS AND THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUMMARILY ENFORCING IT. 
The ambiguity of the language in the letter of April 10, 1991, 
which proposed a general release of claims, was the subject of oral 
argument in the trial court. The trial court erred in interpreting 
this letter by: (1) finding there was a meeting of the minds, and 
(2) finding the letter to be clear and unambiguous. The 
determination of the existence of ambiguity is a question of law, 
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but the interpretation of an ambiguous contract is a question of 
fact* The court stated that it found no ambiguity, but yet, in 
making its ruling, it stated that it considered the "posture of the 
parties" and the factual background. The court ruled, however, 
without conducting an evidentiary hearing on the factual 
background, and summarily enforced the agreement by motion. The 
trial court committed reversible error by finding the letter to be 
unambiguous when it is clear that essential terms were missing and 
the letter contemplated a detailed general release agreement, and 
in making an essentially factual finding without the benefit of 
taking evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENFORCING THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT WHEN ITS SPECIFIC TERMS WERE NEVER PROPOSED NOR 
AGREED TO BY DEFENDANTS. 
A judgment entered by the consent of the parties to litigation 
is "in the nature of a contract approved or adopted by the court," 
and the court's authority to approve such an agreement depends upon 
the validity of the agreement. Financial Indemnity Co. v. Bevans, 
38 Or. App. 369, 590 P.2d 276, 277-78 (1979). In Suaarhouse 
Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (1980), the Utah 
Supreme Court set out the elements essential to the validity of 
such an agreement: "(1) a proper subject matter; (2) competent 
parties; (3) an assent or meeting of the minds of the parties; and 
(4) a consideration given for the accord." 
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In the present case, the core issue is whether the third 
element, the existence of an assent or the meeting of the minds of 
the parties, has been shown. The record and the relevant law 
indicate that it has not, thereby making the trial court's 
enforcement of the settlement agreement at issue improper. 
A. There Was No Meeting Of The Minds On The Terms Of The 
Attempted Settlement Agreement, 
For a settlement, which is an agreement to end judicial 
proceedings, to be binding and enforceable, there must be a meeting 
of the minds as to its terms and conditions. Recreational 
Development Co. of America v. American Construction Co., 749 P.2d 
1002, 1005 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987). Thus, the same principles which 
apply to contract law apply to determining the validity of a 
settlement agreement: 
Under basic contract law principles, a contract is not 
formed without a meeting of the minds." " [Contractual 
mutual assent requires assent by all parties to the same 
thing in the same sense so that their minds meet as to 
all the terms." Determining whether the specific terms 
omitted were essential to the agreement requires an 
examination of the entire agreement and the circumstances 
under which the agreement was entered into. 
Crismon v. Western Co. of North America, 742 P.2d 1219, 1221-22 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citations omitted) (quoting Oberhansley v. 
Earle, 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 1977) and Cessna Fin. Corp. v. 
Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048, 1050 (Utah 1978)); accord John Call 
Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 
1987) . 
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For a meeting of the minds to occur, the contract must embody 
"a distinct understanding common to both parties." Gulf Chemical 
Employees Federal Credit Union v. Williams, 107 Idaho 890, 693 P.2d 
1092, 1095 (1984). Further, "[t]he contract must be specific 
enough to show that the parties shared a mutual intent." Id. "If 
contracting parties ascribe different meanings to a material 
contract term which is ambiguous, there has been no meeting of the 
minds and no valid contract exists." Real Equity Diversification, 
Inc. v. Coville, 744 P.2d 756, 758 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987). 
Further, "[i]t is a basic principle of contract law that, in 
order to create a contract, an accceptance must be unconditional, 
identical to the offer, and must not modify, delete or introduce 
any new terms into the offer." Gyurkey v. Babler, 103 Idaho 663, 
651 P.2d 928, 931 (1982). A purported acceptance which adds a 
qualification or requires performance of conditions is not an 
acceptance. Parry v. Walker, 657 P.2d 1000, 1002 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1982) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 60). In other 
words, if a party proposes a material alteration of the contractual 
terms, "the modified offer becomes a counter offer that must be 
accepted unconditionally by the original offeror to create a 
contract." Anderson Excavating and Wrecking Co. v. Certified 
Welding Corp., 769 P.2d 887, 889 (Wyo. 1988). "A purported 
acceptance that changes the terms of an offer in any material 
respect may operate as a counteroffer, but it is not an acceptance 
and does not consummate the contract." Northwest Television Club, 
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Inc. v. Gross Seattle, Inc., 26 Wash. App. 11, 612 P.d 422, 426 
(1980). 
In its minute entry following oral arguments on the summary 
enforcement of the purported settlement agreement, the court 
stated, 
Based on Mr. Lambert's letter and in reviewing the file, 
there was a general release and acceptance of each party. 
It appears that pits [sic] Motion to enforce the 
stipulation on the basis it resolved all matters with 
respect to this case, and there being no dispute, the 
motion is therefore granted. 
(R. 361) During oral argument, the court stated, "there's nothing 
in the record to support the contention that you now assert or that 
your client intends to have you assert that he was thinking about 
this other case as well." (R. 410) 
The evidence on the record which supports this conclusion, and 
to which the trial court referred, was Mr. Lambert's letter of 
April 10, 1991, which referenced this case, John Deere v. A & H 
Equipment, et al, and stated that "I have been asked by my client 
to propose a settlement with your client in the above referenced 
case. The settlement proposal is a mutual dismissal with prejudice 
and general release of claims with each party to bear their 
respective costs and fees." (R. 315) (Emphasis added.) Also, the 
record shows that the John Deere Farm Plan judgment arose from a 
separate action entitled Farm Plan Corp. v. A & H Equipment, Inc. 
and Wendell Hansen. 
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There is no other evidence on the record which specifically 
supports the trial court's conclusion, but there is substantial 
evidence on the record to lead one to the opposite conclusion. 
The record indicates that defendants, through Mr. Lambert, 
intended to make a general and inclusive resolution of all issues 
included in the present case, including the issues raised in 
plaintiff's complaint and the issues raised in defendants' 
counterclaim. Defendants' counterclaim not only included issues 
raised in opposition to plaintiff's complaint but referred to to 
circumstances and facts and incorporated agreements underlying the 
Farm Plan action. Thus, some of the facts and issues underlying 
the John Deere Farm Plan judgment were raised in plaintiff's 
counterclaim, and arose out of the same nucleus of operative fact 
as the issues raised in plaintiff's complaint. Further, plaintiff 
and Farm Plan, although nominally separate corporations, were 
intrinsically functionally related in making business arrangements 
with defendant because Farm Plan is plaintiff's financing arm 
through which plaintiff organizes and finances its dealership 
arrangements with persons such as defendants, much like GMAC is to 
General Motors. Finally, lead counsel for plaintiffs was also 
counsel for Farm Plan in the Farm Plan lawsuit, and was very 
familiar with the issues underlying both lawsuits and the existence 
of the John Deere Farm Plan judgment. Plaintiff, accordingly, 
should have reasonably understood the general and inclusive wording 
of defendants' offer to include the resolution of all underlying 
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issues, obligations and concerns relating to defendants' franchise 
relationship, including the John Deere Farm Plan judgment. 
Plaintiff responded to defendant's offer of settlement by a 
telephone call and a letter, in which no terms were discussed or 
defined, and by writing a settlement agreement by which it 
unilaterally provided terms limiting the proposed settlement 
agreement to a release of only those claims made in the present 
action. The record indicates that the parties did not propose 
terms that had a distinct and common understanding. Because the 
wording on the settlement agreement provided by plaintiffs did not 
correspond with the defendants7intent in making a general release, 
but substantially limited the scope of the release, plaintiff's 
proposed settlement agreement constituted a rejection of the terms 
offered by defendant and, accordingly, constituted a counter-offer 
rather than an acceptance. When informed of the terms offered by 
plaintiff, defendants rejected them and refused to sign the 
settlement agreement. Mr. Lambert, by his letter of July 29, 1991, 
clearly conveyed defendant's rejection of plaintiff's proposed 
terms and the grounds for their rejection to plaintiffs. Mr. 
Lambert, in this letter, attempted further negotiations as to the 
terms of the agreement, which were rejected by plaintiff. 
Accordingly, there was no meeting of the minds on the terms of the 
proposed settlement agreement, but only an offer and a counter-
offer. No enforceable contract came into existence. 
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The Utah Court of Appeals considered a similar situation in 
Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), which case the 
trial court stated, in its verbal ruling, to be controlling of the 
outcome of this case, but did not follow. In Brown, the parties, 
a divorcing husband and wife, engaged in settlement negotiations, 
over a fifteen-month period, regarding the amount of child support 
and alimony. Mr. Brown's counsel caused Mrs. Brown's counsel to 
believe that the issues had been resolved and that the time which 
had been scheduled for the parties' depositions could be used to 
record a settlement agreement. The parties and their respective 
counsel met on the scheduled date. The proposed settlement 
agreement reduced the amount of alimony and increased the amount of 
child support due to Mrs. Brown. During the negotiations, both 
counsel and Mr. Brown spoke, but Mrs. Brown said nothing. After 
the purported agreement was reduced to writing and sent to Mrs. 
Brown, she rejected it, believing it to be unfair. Subsequently, 
Mr. Brown filed a motion for an order approving and enforcing the 
settlement agreement. Id. at 3 34. Mrs. Brown opposed this motion 
with an affidavit, indicating that: 
[H]er former counsel had assured her that increases in 
alimony and child support were justified and that he was 
confident she would win major increases in both; that she 
was unaware of the tenor of the proposed settlement 
agreement until the day scheduled for her deposition; 
that her former counsel informed her that he told 
opposing counsel that she would agree to the settlement, 
that she was "shocked, dismayed, dissapointed [sic], and 
confused" by her counsel's change in position; that she 
didn't recall speaking at the proceeding; and that she 
refused to sign the written agreement. 
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Id. The Utah Court of Appeals held that, because the agreement had 
not been made in court and because Mrs. Brown did not assent, at 
any time, to the terms of the agreement, the stipulation was not 
binding. Id. The Utah Court reasoned, "[b]asic to a valid 
stipulation is a meeting of the minds of those involved. The 
parties must have completed their negotiations either in person or 
through their attorneys acting within the rules of agency," and 
that because Mrs. Brown had not assented to the stipulation but 
remained silent, and that silence could not be construed to be 
assent under the circumstances, the stipulation was not binding. 
Id. at 335. 
Brown is virtually indistinguishable from the present 
situation. Like Mrs. Brown, defendants did not assent to the terms 
of the settlement agreement proposed by plaintiff and, unlike Mrs. 
Brown, defendants clearly indicated their non-acceptance of the 
agreement. Accordingly, to be consistent with the principle of law 
outlined in Brown, this court should find that the parties did not 
enter into an enforceable agreement because defendants did not 
assent to the materially different terms proposed by plaintiff. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in contrast, in Murray v. State. 737 
P.2d 1000 (Utah 1987), affirmed the summary enforcement of a 
settlement agreement where where the offer had been made by the 
State in writing and confirmed by a telephone conversation, 
plaintiff's attorney informed the State that he had discussed the 
offer with the plaintiffs and they had accepted it, the State's 
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counsel forwarded a release and a check for the amount offered to 
the plaintiff's attorney and, thereafter, the plaintiff changed her 
mind and would not sign the release. The Murray court noted that 
"[pjlaintiffs have not at any time argued that an agreement was not 
reached and, in fact, at oral argument, conceded such agreement. 
There appears to be no reason for noncompliance with the settlement 
other than [the plaintiff's] change of mind." Murray. 737 P.2d at 
1001. This opinion underlines the pertinent rule of law: Where a 
meeting of the minds has occurred, a settlement agreement is 
enforceable; where there has not been a meeting of the minds, a 
settlement agreement is unenforceable. 
Likewise, the Utah Court, in Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Travelstead. 592 P.2d 605 (Utah 1979), held that a settlement 
agreeement was enforceable, even though not ratified by the court 
before enforcement was sought, because there was substantial and 
sufficient evidence to show that the parties had, in fact, entered 
into an enforceable agreement. Id. at 608. Nevertheless, the 
court observed that: 
[I]t is apparent that the summary procedure for 
enforcement of unperformed settlement contracts is not a 
panacea for the myriad types of problems that may arise. 
The summary procedure is admirably suited to situations 
where, for example, a binding settlement bargain is 
conceded or shown, and the excuse for nonperformance is 
comparatively unsubstantial. On the other hand, it is 
ill suited to situations presenting complex factual 
issues related either to the formation or the 
consummation of the contract, which only testimonial 
exploration in a more plenary proceeding is apt to 
satisfactorily resolve. 
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Id at 607 (quoting Autera v. Robinson, 13 6 U.S. App. D. C. 216, 419 
F.2d 1197, 1200 (1969)). 
The present situation is distinguishable from both Murray and 
Tracy Collins Bank & Trust because, in both cases, there was no 
question that an agreement had been reached, while the predominant 
dispute in this case is whether an agreement ever came into being. 
The Utah Court of Appeals, in Zions First Nat'l Bank v. 
Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 478, 480 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989), affirmed the summary enforcement of a settlement agreement 
where the defendants did not clearly express their intention not to 
settle the dispute on the proposed terms. The court stated that 
the defendants "would have been in a position to defeat summary 
enforcement of the settlement through an affidavit identifying the 
specific statements and actions they had taken to communicate to 
Zions their decision not to accept the settlement offer at that 
time," if they had clearly expressed their intention during the 
settlement conference. Id. Barbara Jensen Interiors does not 
represent an applicable precedent for resolution of the present 
case because defendants, through Mr. Lambert, not only clearly 
communicated their rejection of the terms proposed by plaintiff in 
his letter of July 29, 1991, but Mr. Lambert provided an affidavit 
to this effect to the trial court. 
Other jurisdictions have upheld the same principle of law. 
For example, the Wyoming Court found that there was no meeting of 
the minds and, therefore, no contract, where the plaintiff sent a 
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lease agreement to the defendant, who reviewed it and called 
plaintiff to discuss the terms, and then altered the document to 
reflect the negotiated changes, initialled the changes, signed the 
document, and returned it to the plaintiff. Anderson Excavating 
and Wrecking Co. , 769 P. 2d at 889. Similarly, the New Mexico Court 
overturned an order of dismissal that rested upon a release, in 
which counsel for one party drew up a stipulation for dismissal and 
submitted it to counsel for the other party, who added a 
significant additional term to agreement which counsel for the 
first party rejected. Fratello v. Socorro Electric Cooperative, 
107 N.M. 378, 758 P.2d 792, 795 (N.M. 1988). The Fratello court 
reasoned that there was no unconditional acceptance of the offer of 
settlement because of the addition of the significant additional 
term to the offer. Id.; accord Financial Indemnity Co., 590 P.2d 
at 278. Likewise, the Colorado Supreme Court, in H.W. Houston 
Construction Co. v. District Court, 632 P.2d 563 (Colo. 1981), 
found that a settlement agreement was not reached under the 
following circumstances: The corporate plaintiff, whose truck had 
been damaged and whose driver had been severely injured in an 
accident caused by defendant, stipulated the amount of property 
damage to plaintiffs during a pre-trial conference. Some time 
later, the parties' attorneys reached a compromise and settlement 
agreement. The defendants each tendered a check to the plaintiff 
in the aggregate amount of the stipulated property damage, along 
with a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice and a general 
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release from all liability. The plaintiff's attorney refused to 
execute the stipulations and informed his client that he would not 
allow it to accept the settlement because he had understood the 
settlement agreement to be for the amount of property damage only 
and not for the injuries to the driver. The plaintiff's attorney 
offered to accept the tendered checks in full settlement of the 
plaintiff's claim for property damage or to return the checks and 
go to trial on both issues. The defendants rejected plaintiff's 
offers, preferring instead to attempt to enforce the alleged 
agreement. Id. at 564-65. The court found that "the parties in 
this case never reached an understanding which could be the basis 
of a binding compromise and settlement," and, therefore, there was 
no enforceable contract. Id. at 565. 
The present case is similar to these cases because the parties 
never achieved a meeting of the minds on material issues. The 
record indicates only a series of offers, counter-offers, and 
negotiations, with no agreement on specific terms. Accordingly, 
this Court should find that no enforceable contract exists or ever 
did, and the trial court erred so finding and summarily enforcing 
the settlement offer proposed by the plaintiff. 
B. Mr. Lambert Did Not Have Authority To Settle The Lawsuit 
On Terms Different Than Those Agreed To By Defendants. 
Mr. Lambert, counsel for defendants, did not have the 
authority to settle the lawsuit on terms different than those 
agreed to by defendants. It is a well-settled rule of law that an 
"attorney is authorized by virtue of his employment to bind the 
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client in procedural matters arising during the course of the 
action," but is not authorized, "merely by virtue of his retention 
in litigation, to ximpair the client's substantial rights or the 
causes of action itself.'" Blanton v. Womancare Inc., 38 Cal. 3d 
396, 696 P.2d 645, 650, 212 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1985) (quoting Linsk v. 
Linsk, 70 Cal. 2d 272, 449 P.2d 760, 74 Cal. Rptr 544 (1969)). 
Thus, "an attorney ordinarily has no apparent authority to settle 
his client's action without the client's consent." Miotk v. Rudy, 
227 Kan. 296, 605 P.2d 587, 591 (1980). With respect to this 
issue, the Kansas court approved the following language from Reimer 
v. Davis, 224 Kan. 25, 580 P.2d 81, 85 (1978): 
We have previously considered the nature and extent of an 
attorney's authority in handling a client's case. It has 
been recognized generally that a client is bound by the 
appearance, admissions, and actions of counsel acting on 
behalf of his client. The rule is limited, however, to 
control over procedural matters incident to litigation. 
The client has control over the subject matter of 
litigation. An attorney has no authority to compromise 
or settle his client's claim without his client's 
approval. 
Miotk, 605 P.2d at 590 (citations omitted). Accordingly, for an 
attorney to bind a client to a settlement agreement, "he must have 
specific authority to do so, unless there is an emergency or some 
overriding reason for enforcing the settlement despite the 
attorney's lack of specific authority." Bolles v. Smith, 92 N.M. 
524, 591 P.2d 278, 280 (1979). An attorney's authority is not 
enlarged simply because the contract is entered into in conjunction 
with pending litigation. Blanton, 696 P.2d at 652. 
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In the present case, the agreement at issue is not procedural; 
it relates to the dismissal of both parties' claims against the 
other. Thus, the parties, themselves, must approve the terms of 
any agreement; absent the parties' express approval of the terms, 
counsel for the parties do not have authority to enter into the 
agreement. Defendants only authorized Mr. Lambert to settle the 
entire claim, not the limited issues to which plaintiff wished to 
restrict the settlement agreement. Defendants did not authorize 
Mr. Lambert to enter into an agreement settling less than all of 
the issues involved, including issues relating to the Farm Plan 
action which they raised in their counterclaim. Accordingly, to 
the extent that Mr. Lambert's letter of April 10, 1991 purported to 
propose settlement terms limiting the settlement to only those 
issues and obligations raised in plaintiff's complaint, Mr. Lambert 
did not have actual or apparent authority to accept plaintiff's 
settlement terms and acted rightly in refusing to do so. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENFORCING THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
WHEN THE AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY PILED WITH THE 
COURT OR ENTERED UPON THE MINUTES OF THE COURT. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-32 (1992) , provides, in relevant part: 
An attorney and counselor has authority: 
• • • 
(2) to bind his client in any of the steps of an 
action or proceeding by his agreement filed with the 
clerk and entered upon the minutes of the court, and not 
otherwise. 
This language is echoed by Rule 4-504(8) of the Code of 
Judicial Administration, which states: 
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No orders, judgments or decrees based upon stipulation 
shall be signed or entered unless the stipulation is in 
writing, signed by the attorneys of record for the 
respective parties and filed with the clerk or the 
stipulation was made on the record. 
Judge Davidson, in his concurrence to Zions First Nat7! Bank v. 
Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989), states that Rule 4-504(8) was "formerly a rule of practice 
in the courts and was therefore not afforded the full enforcement 
of a rule of civil procedure," but that because it "has now been 
elevated into the Code of Judicial Administration, it is now 
entitled to enforcement equal to that given other rules." 
The language of these rules indicates that, for a stipulation 
to be binding on the parties, it should be written, signed, and 
filed with the clerk, or entered into in court. This rule is 
somewhat flexible in the case of settlement stipulations because of 
the limiting language contained in Rule 4-504(10) of the Rules of 
Judicial Administration, which states that "[n]othing in this rule 
shall be construed to limit the power of any court, upon a proper 
showing, to enforce a settlement agreement or any other agreement 
which has not been reduced to writing"; however, that flexibility 
does not extend to a situation where it is clear that a written 
agreement was contemplated by the parties. 
The Utah Courts have interpreted the intent of these rules to 
allow enforcement of oral settlement agreements, provided that 
there are clear indicia on the record that an agreement was 
actually made. Absent a clear finding that the parties actually 
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entered into a valid settlement agreement, such a stipulation would 
have to have been entered into before the court or be in writing, 
signed by the parties and/or their counsel, and be filed with the 
clerk of the court to be binding. 
Judge Bench, in his concurring and dissenting opinion to Zions 
First Nat'l Bank v, Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 478 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), succinctly set forth this rule: 
In Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987), this court aplied the predecessor to rule 4-504(8) 
and expressly held that settlement agreements must be in 
the form of a written stipulation to be enforceable. I 
believe Brown is indistinguishable from the instant case. 
The only exception to the rule that settlement 
agreements must be in writing is where the parties 
concede the existence of an agreement. Throughout the 
instant case, the Jensens have consistently denied that 
an agreement was ever reached. 
In view of the clear language of rule 4-504(8) and 
our decision in Brown, I would reverse the order 
compelling settlement and remand the case for trial. 
Id. at 481-82 (citations omitted). 
As discussed above, the court in Brown v. Brown, 744 P. 2d 333, 
335 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) , held that, because the Browns' agreement 
had not been made in court and because Mrs. Brown did not assent, 
at any time, to the terms of the agreement, the stipulation the 
parties entered into to settle child support and alimony issues was 
not binding. Id. at 3 35. The Brown court stated: 
For a stipulation to be binding, agreement by the parties 
must be evidenced by a signed writing which would satisfy 
the Statute of Frauds, or the agreement must be stated in 
court on the record before a judge. The facts in this 
case do not show such evidence. Therefore, there was no 
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stipulation reached between the parties and there is 
nothing for the court to enforce. 
Brown, 744 P.2d at 335. 
This rule is directly applicable to the present case. In the 
present case, the alleged settlement agreement was not entered into 
before the court and is not on the record; and has not been 
evidenced by a writing, signed by the parties or their counsel, and 
filed with the clerk of the court. Thus, for this agreement to be 
binding, there must be substantial evidence that an agreement was 
actually reached. The record indicates that no agreement was 
actually reached, making the present situation virtually 
indistinguishable from that in Brown. and the reasoning outlined by 
Judge Bench in Barbara Jensen Interiors applicable. 
In conclusion, § 78-51-32(2) and Rule 4-504(8), and the case 
law interpreting these statutes, compel the conclusion that the 
proposed settlement agreement is unenforceable. Accordingly, this 
Court should find that the trial court erred in summarily enforcing 
the proposed settlement agreement. 
III. IP THE AGREEMENT WAS ENFORCEABLE, IT WAS ENTERED INTO BY 
MISTAKE AND SHOULD BE FOUND TO BE VOID. 
In the event that this court should find the settlement 
agreement at issue to be enforceable, the trial court's ruling that 
it is a valid settlement agreement should still be reversed because 
it was entered into as the result of a unilateral mistake. 
In B & A Assocs. v. L.A. Young Sons Constr. Co., 796 P.2d 692 
(Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court delineated the elements of 
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mutual mistake of fact sufficient to make an otherwise valid 
contract unenforceable, as follows: 
1. The mistake must be of so grave a consequence 
that to enforce the contract as actually made would be 
unconscionable. 
2. The matter as to which the mistake was made 
must relate to a material feature of the contract. 
3. Generally the mistake must have occurred 
notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary diligence by the 
party making the mistake. 
4. It must be possible to give relief by way of 
rescission without serious prejudice to the other party 
except the loss of the bargain. In other words, it must 
be possible to put him in status quo. 
Id. at 695 (quoting John Call Engineering, 743 P.2d at 1209-10)). 
Although defendants knew about this judgment and clearly 
intended to settle not only the issues raised in plaintiff's 
complaint but also the John Deere Farm Plan judgment, their 
counsel, Mr. Lambert, was not involved in the Farm Plan case and 
was unaware of the existence of the John Deere Farm Plan judgment 
until after the settlement negotiations culminating in the 
purported settlement agreement had been initiated. In contrast, 
plaintiff and Farm Plan, the affiliated financing arm of plaintiff 
through whose instrumentality plaintiff established farm equipment 
dealerships, were well aware of the judgment based upon Farm Plan's 
claims, and the underlying circumstances for the issues defendants 
addressed in their counterclaim. Not only was plaintiff aware of 
the Farm Plan judgment, plaintiff's counsel, Kim Wilson, was also 
aware of the judgment, having also served as counsel on the Farm 
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Plan case. Thus, even though defendant's counsel was unaware of 
the judgment, plaintiff was aware, making it a unilateral mistake. 
As a consequence, Mr. Lambert did not explictly know about the 
judgment in the Farm Plan case on April 10, 1991, so was not able 
to specify, in his letter of April 10, 1991, that defendants' 
settlement offer included and was conditioned upon the release of 
all claims between these parties. 
The facts of the present case satisfy the elements set forth 
in B & A Assocs. 
First, the mistake is so grave as to make the contract, as 
made, unconscionable. If this settlement agreement is enforced, 
defendants will have lost the right to litigate the claims set 
forth in their counterclaim and will also have lost the benefit of 
the bargain which they intended to make, namely, to dismiss their 
obligation on the John Deere Farm Plan judgment. This is serious 
enough to render the enforcement of the bargain unconscionable 
because defendants will have given up something of value, their 
right to pursue their counterclaim without receiving the benefit of 
the bargain they were willing to make. 
Second, the matter relates to a material feature of the 
contract. Defendants'counterclaims were related, in part, to the 
circumstances underlying the judgment and, in part, to the 
circumstances underlying the complaint. Absent dismissal of all 
the issues related to this litigation, including the judgment, 
defendants would not have been willing to dismiss their 
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counterclaim, making the mistake of fact highy material to the 
agreement• 
Third, the mistake occurred despite Mr. Lambert's ordinary 
diligence. Because Mr. Lambert had not been involved in the John 
Deere Farm Plan judgment, he was not aware of it and would not have 
been aware of it in the course of pursuing the present action. 
Finally, it is possible to give relief to defendants without 
unduly prejudicing plaintiff. If the settlement agreement is found 
to be unenforceable, the only result is that plaintiffs will have 
to litigate their lawsuit. It is universally held that a party is 
not prejudiced by being forced to litigate its own lawsuit. 
Rescission of the purported settlement agreement will serve to 
simply place the parties in status quo, in the exact position they 
would have been in absent the purported settlement agreement. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also held that "[w]hen one party's 
mistake of fact is coupled with knowledge of the mistake by the 
other party or a mistake is produced by fraud or other inequitable 
conduct by the nonerring party, the mistake provides a basis for 
reformation or rescission." B & A Assocs. , 796 P. 2d at 696. 
Indeed, reformation or rescission may be available "where, unknown 
to one of the parties, an instrument contains a mistake rendering 
it at variance with the prior understanding and agreement of the 
parties, and the other party learns of the mistake at the time of 
the execution of the instrument and later seeks to take advantage 
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of it." Id. (quoting Spirt v. Albert, 109 Conn. 292, 146 A. 717, 
720 (1929)). 
This principle of law is applicable to the present case. 
Plaintiff was well aware of the existence of the Farm Plan 
judgment, the underlying facts, and the fact that defendants 
probably intended to include this judgment in the settlement 
agreement. Mr. Lambert did not know about it. Plaintiff now 
seeks, because Mr. Lambert did not specifically identify this 
judgment in the language of his letcer, to take advantage of this 
situation and to maintain that defendants did not mean to include 
it in the agreement. In the words of Fogdall v. Lewis & Clark 
College, 38 Or. App. 541, 590 P.2d 775, 779 (1979) (quoting Klimek 
v. Perisch, 231 Or. 71, 371 P.2d 956, 958 (1962)), "x[ri]either 
party to a contract may assume that a contract exists if he knows 
that the other party does not intend what his words or actions may 
seem to express.'" Accordingly, defendants should not be bound by 
the contract that plaintiff sought to make, in light of plaintiff's 
knowledge of the underlying factual situation and Mr. Lambert's 
mistake of fact. 
IV. IF AN AGREEMENT EXISTED, ITS TERMS WERE AMBIGUOUS AND THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUMMARILY ENFORCING IT. 
The clarity or ambiguity of the language in the letter of 
April 10, 1991, which proposed a "general release of claims" was 
the subject of oral argument in the trial court below. The trial 
court's ruled verbally from the bench, stating: 
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And based on the letter, your letter, and in view of the 
pleadings in this case, which I have reviewed, and the 
posture of these parties, it appears evident to the Court 
that the only thing that reasonably could have been 
contemplated is that it involved a general release of 
claims of each party with respect to the matter that is 
pending before the Court in this action. 
(R. 412) 
The trial court erred in its interpretation of the letter 
which proposed a settlement with plaintiff. First, the court erred 
in finding that there was a meeting of the minds, which issue has 
been fully discussed in Point I above. Second, the court erred, as 
a matter of law, in its interpretation of the letter. If the 
language of the April 10, 1991 letter was clear and unambiguous, 
the court need not have considered the "posture of these parties" 
in order to interpret it. Once the court began to consider the 
"posture of these parties," it was incumbent upon the court to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing on the factual background rather 
than summarily enforce the agreement by motion. The letter of 
April 10, 1991, stated, "I have been asked by my client to propose 
a settlement with your client in the above-referenced case. The 
settlement proposal is a mutual dismissal with prejudice and a 
general release of claims with each party to bear their respective 
costs and fees." (R. 315) 
The letter contemplates two separate acts of legal 
significance: The dismissal of the case and, conjunctively, an 
agreement for the release of all claims between these parties. It 
is also clear that two separate documents were to be prepared to 
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set forth a stipulation for dismissal of the pending action and to 
memorialize the "general release of claims" which were outstanding 
between the parties. It is customary in such releases that the 
claims being released will be described in excruciating detail. 
Such documents as prepared by plaintiff's counsel, contained terms 
therein or omitted terms therefrom which were material to the 
defendants and made the proposed documents unacceptable to 
defendants. 
As a general rule in the Utah courts, "[l]anguage in a written 
document is ambiguous if the words may be understood to support two 
or more plausible meanings. A court is justified in determining 
that a contract or order is ambiguous if its terms are either 
unclear or missing." Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57, 60 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The 
determination of whether an ambiguity exists in contractual 
language is a legal determination for the court and, on appeal, is 
not entitled to deference. Id. Similarly, in the absence of 
ambiguity, construction of a written document is a question of law 
not entitled to deference by the appellate court. Terry v. Price 
Municipal Corp., 784 P.2d 146, 149 (Utah 1989). 
In the present case, because it is clear that further 
documentation of the agreement was required and was, in fact, 
prepared, the agreement, if any, was, by definition, ambiguous 
because material terms were missing. Plaintiff has argued that the 
language of the letter restricts the offer to a settlement of only 
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those issues and obligations raised in its complaint. Defendants 
argue, in contrast, that the wording of the offer is sufficiently 
general as to contemplate a global release of claims. The record 
also indicates that there was no distinct or definite understanding 
reached by the parties at to the exact meaning of the language. 
Because this language, therefore, is subject to at least two 
plausible meanings, it is ambiguous. Accordingly, parol evidence 
as to the partial intent should have been taken by the trial court 
in seeking to interpret this language. 
These parties had a lengthy history of dealings with numerous 
contracts directly with John Deere and with John Deere affiliates. 
Construction of an agreement in such a case is a question of fact 
and parol evidence may be used in arriving at an interpretation. 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Daskalas, 785 P.2d 1112, 
1118 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). This court has noted that: 
[I]t is a fundamental rule that in the construction of 
contracts the courts may look not only to the language 
employed but to the subject matter and the surrounding 
circumstances, and may avail themselves of the same light 
which the parties possessed when the contract was made. 
To ascertain that intention, regard must be had to the 
nature of the instrument itself, the condition of the 
parties executing it, and the objects which they had in 
view. 
In the present case, the trial court made no findings. The 
court took no evidence other than to consider the affidavit 
submitted by defendants' counsel. The trial court did not resolve 
this essentially factual issue by recieving evidence, but summarily 
decided the issue based only upon the memoranda and oral arguments 
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of the respective counsel. The trial court's action in failing to 
take evidence on an issue of fact is reversible error. This court, 
therefore, should reverse the trial court's summary enforcement of 
the proposed settlement agreement and remand for trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants respectfully request that this Court find that the 
trial court erred in summarily enforcing plaintiff's proposed 
settlement order, reverse the trial court's judgment, and remand 
the case to the trial court for trial. 
DATED this day of January 1993. 
D. DAVID LAMBERT a.v@ 
LINDA J. BARCLAY for 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
was mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this I °[^\\ day of 
January, 1993. 
R. Brent Stephens 
Ryan E. Tibbits 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 






JOHN DEERE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
A & H EQUIPMENT, INC. et al 
Defendant. 
CASE NUMBER: CV 89 1151 
DATE: August 28, 1992 
CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE 
Rept: Vonda Bassett, CSR 
ORAL ARGUMENTS 
This was the time set for hearing oral arguments on 
pending motions. R. Brent Stephens appeared as counsel for the 
plaintiff and D. David Lambert as counsel for the defendant. 
Mr. Stephens addressed the Court anb argued the Motion 
to enforce Settlement Agreement. 
Mr. lambert responded. Background of the case reviewed 
for the Court. 
Mr. Stephen argued on rebuttal. Matter submitted. 
The Court, in looking at the Brown Case, is bound by the 
majority ruling. Matter discussed. 
Based on Mr. Lambert's letter and in reviewing the file, 
there was a general release and acceptance of each party. It 
appears that pits Motion to enforce the stipulation on the basis 
it resolved all matters with respect to this case, and there being 
no dispute, the motion is therefore granted. 
Mr. Stephens to prepare the Order, submit to Mr. Lambert 
to approve as to form and file same with the Court for signing and 
filing. 
fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, Stau ^ Utah 
CARMA B. SMITH, Clerk 
V* Deputy 
R. BRENT STEPHENS (A3098) ' " ~~ 
KIM R. WILSON (A3512) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN DEERE COMPANY, 
P l a i n t i f f , O R D E R 
v s . 
A & H EQUIPMENT, INC., WENDELL Civil No. CV-89-1151 
HANSEN, MARK B. ANDERSON, and Judge Cullen Y. Christensen 
VADA A. ANDERSON, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and 
defendants' cross-motion to enforce settlement agreement came on 
regularly for hearing before the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen 
on August 28, 1992, at 3:00 p.m. Plaintiff was represented by 
its counsel R. Brent Stephens of the law firm of Snow, 
christensen & Martineau, and defendants were represented by their 
counsel D. David Lambert of the law firm of Howard, Lewis & 
Petersen. 
The Court reviewed the submissions and memoranda and 
affidavit submitted by the parties, and the court heard oral 
argument. After being fully apprised, the Court hereby orders 
the following: 
1. Plaintiff1s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is 
hereby granted. 
2. Defendants1 Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is 
hereby denied. 
3. This action is settled upon the following terms and 
conditions: 
a. A Stipulation, Motion and Judgment of 
Dismissal with prejudice as to the Complaint and 
Counterclaim will be signed by counsel and presented to 
the Court in the form attached hereto as Exhibit ,fA.,f 
b. The Mutual Release of All Claims attached 
hereto as Exhibit ,fBff is hereby declared in full force 
and effect as though executed by all of the defendants. 
DATED this day of September, 1992. 
B Y T H E C O U R T : 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
IISTENSEN 




Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State .J Jtah 
CARMA B. SMITH, Clerk 
R. BRENT STEPHENS (A3098) 1$ .Deputy 
KIM R. WILSON (A3512) " ~ 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN DEERE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
VS. 
A & H EQUIPMENT, INC., WENDELL Civil No. CV-89-1151 
HANSEN, MARK B. ANDERSON, and Judge Cullen Y. Christensen 
VADA A. ANDERSON, 
Defendants. 
Based upon the Stipulation and Motion of the parties, and 
good cause appearing therefor, it is hereby 
ORDERED that plaintiff's complaint and defendants' 
Counterclaim be and hereby are dismissed with prejudice, and upon 
the merits, with each party to bear their own costs and 
attorneys' fees. 
DATED this day of September, 1992. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Cynthia Northstrom, being duly sworn, says that she is 
employed by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 
attorneys for plaintiff herein; that she served the attached 
proposed JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL (Case Number CV-89-1151, Fourth 
Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah) 
upon the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy 
thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
D. David Lambert, Esq. 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
Post Office Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the M^ 1 day of September, 1992. 




re me day of 
NOTARt PUBLIC 
Residing in the State of Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
2 -3A -<?4 NOTARY PUBLIC LYNETTE FARMER 
10 Exchange Pf ace 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
My Commission Expires 
August 24,1994 
STATE OP UTAH 
Jackson Howard 
S. Rex Lewis 
Don R. Petersen 
Craig M. Snyder 
John L. Valentine 
D. David Lambert 
Fred D. Howard 
Leslie W. Slaugh 
Kevin J. Suttcrficid 
F. Richards Smith, m 
Linda J. Barclay 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
Post Office Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
April 10, 1991 




Our File No. 19,456 
R. Brent Stephens, Esq. 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Re: John Deere v. A & H Equipment, et al. 
Dear Brent: 
I have been asked by my client to propose a settlement with your client in the above 
referenced case. The settlement proposal is a mutual dismissal with prejudice and general 
release of claims with each party to bear their respective costs and fees. 
As you may know, the defendants have been involved in other litigation and have 
generally suffered serious financial reversals. I have evaluated the position of my clients and 
I believe that they have everything to gain by going forward with the litigation on the 
counterclaim and little or nothing to lose because they could not respond to a judgment if you 
were to obtain one. 
If this proposal is unacceptable, I need to immediately schedule a time to review your 
document production and dates for depositions. If I do not have your response by April 22* 
1991, I will proceed with discovery scheduling. 
Respectfully, 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
D. David Lamb 
cc: A & H Equipment 
MUTUAL RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS 
IN CONSIDERATION of the mutual dismissal of the Complaint of John Deere 
Company (hereinafter the "Plaintiff") and the Counterclaim of A 4 H Equipment, 
I n c . , Wendell Hansen, Mark B- Anderson, and Vada A. Anderson (hereinafter the 
"Defendants") Plaintiff and Defendants hereby release and forever discharge the 
other from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action or 
suits of whatever kind or na ture , which now exist of which may hereafter accrue, 
because of, for, arising out of or in any way connected with that contractual 
dispute, the details of which are more fully set forth in the files and records of 
the District Court of Utah County, in that certain action entitled John Deere 
Company, plaintiff v . A & H Equipment, Inc . , Wendell Hansen, Mark B. Anderson, 
and Vada A. Anderson, defendants, Civil No. CV-89-1151, pending in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah. 
The Settling Parties understand and agree that this is a release of all claims 
and includes but is not limited to contractual claims and profits, claims for damages 
and claims for both direct and consequential damages of any and all kind or 
character . 
The Settling Parties understand and agree that this settlement is made for 
the purpose of compromising a disputed claim and shall not be construed as an 
admission of liability, since any liability is expressly denied. 
This Release of All Claims may be executed in counterparts. 
JOHN DEERE COMPANY 
Dated By 
Its 






MARK B. ANDERSON 
Dated 
VADA A. ANDERSON 
21\RBS\12976.0<M Release 
